root
42 lines
1.9 KiB
JavaScript
42 lines
1.9 KiB
JavaScript
import path from 'node:path';
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import { config } from '../config.js';
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export class SandboxViolationError extends Error {
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constructor(message) {
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super(message);
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this.name = 'SandboxViolationError';
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}
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}
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/**
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* Resolves `relativePath` against `root` and guarantees the result stays
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* inside `root`. Throws SandboxViolationError on any attempt to escape
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* (e.g. via `..`, absolute paths outside the root, or symlink-style tricks
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* handled at the OS level by the caller when it actually touches the fs).
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*/
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export function resolveWorkspacePath(root, relativePath) {
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const absoluteRoot = path.resolve(root);
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const target = path.resolve(absoluteRoot, relativePath || '.');
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const normalizedRoot = absoluteRoot.toLowerCase();
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const normalizedTarget = target.toLowerCase();
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if (normalizedTarget !== normalizedRoot && !normalizedTarget.startsWith(normalizedRoot + path.sep)) {
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throw new SandboxViolationError(`Refusing to access "${relativePath}": it resolves outside the workspace root (${absoluteRoot}).`);
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}
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return target;
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}
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function basenameNoExt(binary) {
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const base = path.basename(binary);
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return base.replace(/\.(exe|cmd|bat|ps1)$/i, '');
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}
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/**
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* Throws unless `binary` is on the configured allow-list. Command
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* construction elsewhere in the codebase always passes `args` as a separate
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* array (never a single shell string), so this allow-list is the only line
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* of defense needed against arbitrary command execution.
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*/
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export function assertAllowedBinary(binary) {
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const name = basenameNoExt(binary).toLowerCase();
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const allowed = config.allowedBinaries.some((candidate) => candidate.toLowerCase() === name);
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if (!allowed) {
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throw new SandboxViolationError(`Refusing to run "${binary}": it is not on the allow-list (${config.allowedBinaries.join(', ')}).`);
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}
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map
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