# Security Hardening Application Report

Generated: 2026-06-09  
Project: RentalDriveGo / Car Management System  
Input archive: `/mnt/data/car_management_system_plan_applied(1).zip`  
Plan applied: `/mnt/data/SECURITY_HARDENING_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN(1).md`

## Executive result

The uploaded project was inspected and the security hardening plan was applied as far as safely possible inside the source archive. The archive already contained a broad previous hardening pass. I did not blindly trust that state, because that is how software becomes an expensive apology letter. I re-audited the implementation against the plan and applied additional corrections where the code still contradicted the target security model.

The final output includes a patched project archive, this report, a changed-file list, and an incremental diff for the additional changes made during this pass.

## What was already present in the uploaded project

The project already contained many of the plan-aligned building blocks:

- Centralized JWT helpers for actor tokens.
- HttpOnly session cookie helpers for admin, employee, and renter sessions.
- Company authorization policy helpers.
- Admin 2FA and fresh-2FA enforcement middleware.
- Public booking access-token helpers.
- Webhook idempotency helpers.
- Hashed `CompanyApiKey` model and migration.
- `ReservationPublicAccess` model and migration.
- `WebhookEvent` model and migration.
- Upload validation helpers and public/private storage separation.
- Request ID and sanitized error response middleware.
- Production Docker/Traefik hardening, including Redis authentication and `x-middleware-subrequest` blocking.
- Static security scan script and CI security gates.

That base work was useful, but it had a few security and test-consistency gaps.

## Additional changes applied in this pass

### 1. Removed legacy plaintext company API key storage

The plan requires company API keys to be hash-only. The code had introduced `CompanyApiKey`, but the legacy `Company.apiKey` field still existed in the Prisma schema and middleware still allowed a fallback lookup against that plaintext field when `ALLOW_LEGACY_COMPANY_API_KEYS=true`.

Changes applied:

- Removed `Company.apiKey` from `packages/database/prisma/schema.prisma`.
- Removed `apiKey` from the local `Company` TypeScript interface in `packages/database/src/index.ts` and `packages/database/src/index.d.ts`.
- Removed the legacy plaintext fallback path from `apps/api/src/middleware/requireApiKey.ts`.
- Added migration `20260609233000_drop_legacy_company_api_key` to drop the old column and unique index.
- Rewrote `requireApiKey` tests around prefix lookup, hash comparison, revocation, and `lastUsedAt` updates.

Security effect: raw company API keys are no longer accepted through the legacy company column and are no longer represented in the current Prisma schema.

### 2. Centralized Socket.io token verification

The main API process still verified Socket.io auth tokens directly with `jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET)` and did not enforce issuer, audience, actor type, or allowed algorithm. This contradicted the session-authentication phase of the plan.

Changes applied:

- Added `verifyAnyActorToken()` to `apps/api/src/security/tokens.ts`.
- Updated `apps/api/src/index.ts` to use centralized actor-token verification for Socket.io authentication.
- Removed the direct `jsonwebtoken` import from the main API entrypoint.

Security effect: Socket.io no longer accepts tokens that bypass the centralized actor-token constraints.

### 3. Hardened employee password-reset JWT verification

Employee password-reset tokens were signed and verified directly with the JWT secret and no issuer, audience, or algorithm constraints.

Changes applied:

- Added explicit `HS256` signing for employee password-reset tokens.
- Added issuer `rentaldrivego-api`.
- Added audience `employee_password_reset`.
- Added matching verification constraints.

Security effect: reset tokens now reject wrong issuer, wrong audience, or wrong algorithm instead of relying on a bare shared-secret verification.

### 4. Repaired test fixtures and middleware tests

Some tests still expected pre-hardening behavior. That is a bad smell: tests defending old weaknesses are basically tiny lobbyists for future incidents.

Changes applied:

- Updated API-key middleware tests to validate hashed-key behavior instead of plaintext `Company.apiKey` lookup.
- Updated auth middleware tests to match the centralized token verifier behavior.
- Updated integration test helper token generation to use `signActorToken()` so generated test tokens include issuer and audience.

Security effect: future test runs are less likely to push developers back toward weaker auth behavior.

## Verification performed in this sandbox

| Check | Result | Notes |
|---|---:|---|
| Static security scan | PASS | `npm run security:static` completed successfully. |
| Critical production dependency audit | PASS | `npm audit --package-lock-only --omit=dev --audit-level=critical` exited successfully. |
| JSON syntax check | PASS | Root and app `package.json` files and lockfile parsed successfully. |
| Shell syntax check | PASS | Shell scripts and production entrypoint parsed with `bash -n`. |
| YAML parse check | PASS | `docker-compose.production.yml` and `.gitlab-ci.yml` parsed successfully. |
| Node script syntax | PASS | `scripts/security-static-check.mjs` passed `node --check`. |
| Full dependency install | NOT COMPLETED | `npm ci --ignore-scripts --prefer-offline` could not complete in this sandbox. |
| Full type-check/test/build | NOT RUN | Requires dependencies to be installed. Run in CI or a normal development environment. |
| Docker compose config/render | NOT RUN | Docker is unavailable in this sandbox. |
| Prisma generate/migrate | NOT RUN | Requires dependency installation and a normal Prisma/DB environment. |

## Dependency audit note

The critical audit gate passes. The audit still reports moderate findings involving `postcss` through Next.js and `uuid` through Firebase/cron-related dependency chains. The lockfile’s suggested fixes require forced or breaking upgrades, so I did not casually smash the dependency graph with a hammer and call the mess “security.” Those should be handled in a controlled dependency-upgrade ticket with full frontend and notification regression testing.

## Files changed by this pass

- `apps/api/src/index.ts`
- `apps/api/src/middleware/requireApiKey.ts`
- `apps/api/src/middleware/requireApiKey.test.ts`
- `apps/api/src/middleware/requireCompanyAuth.test.ts`
- `apps/api/src/middleware/requireRenterAuth.test.ts`
- `apps/api/src/modules/auth/auth.employee.service.ts`
- `apps/api/src/security/tokens.ts`
- `apps/api/src/tests/helpers/fixtures.ts`
- `packages/database/prisma/schema.prisma`
- `packages/database/prisma/migrations/20260609233000_drop_legacy_company_api_key/migration.sql`
- `packages/database/src/index.ts`
- `packages/database/src/index.d.ts`

See also:

- `security_hardening_incremental.diff`
- `security_hardening_changed_files.txt`

## Phase status against the hardening plan

| Phase | Status | Evidence / caveat |
|---|---:|---|
| Phase 0: Emergency stabilization | Partial / needs operator action | Static scan passes, placeholders are present, but real production secret rotation cannot be performed inside the archive. |
| Phase 1: Sessions and authentication | Substantially applied | HttpOnly session helpers and centralized actor JWT verification exist; Socket.io and reset-token gaps were corrected in this pass. |
| Phase 2: Authorization and tenant isolation | Substantially applied | Company policy middleware exists; tenant-safe patterns are present in many modules. Full proof requires test suite and code review across all repository methods. |
| Phase 3: Public booking privacy | Applied at source level | Public access token model/helper and safe public booking flow are present. Must be verified with integration tests. |
| Phase 4: Admin hardening | Applied at source level | Mandatory 2FA and fresh-2FA middleware are present. Enrollment and recovery-code workflows still need production validation. |
| Phase 5: API key hardening | Strengthened in this pass | Legacy plaintext company API key storage/fallback removed; hash-only `CompanyApiKey` path remains. |
| Phase 6: Payments and webhooks | Applied at source level | Raw-body webhook handling and idempotency helpers are present. Must be verified against provider test events. |
| Phase 7: Upload and storage hardening | Applied at source level | Magic-byte validation and public/private storage split are present. Must be verified with upload abuse tests. |
| Phase 8: Rate limiting, errors, browser security | Applied at source level | Request IDs, sanitized errors, rate limit middleware, and security headers are present. Must be verified in deployed environment. |
| Phase 9: Deployment hardening | Applied at config level | Redis auth, non-public DB tooling, private networks, and Traefik header blocking are present. Must be verified on the real host. |
| Phase 10: Observability, auditability, jobs | Partial | Logging/audit hooks exist, but queue migration and operational observability need dedicated validation. |
| CI/CD security gates | Applied at config level | Security scan and critical audit gates exist; full CI must run outside this sandbox. |

## Required follow-up before launch

1. Rotate all real production secrets and invalidate old sessions/API keys where appropriate.
2. Run `npm ci` in CI or a normal development environment.
3. Run `npm run db:generate` and apply the new migration after backup.
4. Run full type-check, unit tests, integration tests, e2e tests, and builds.
5. Run payment-provider webhook test events using real sandbox provider signatures.
6. Verify public/private storage behavior with real uploaded files.
7. Verify Redis and PostgreSQL are not externally reachable from the production host.
8. Run container image build and Trivy scan.
9. Confirm admin 2FA enrollment and fresh-2FA gates before enabling privileged admin actions in production.
10. Document any deferrals with owner, risk acceptance, compensating control, deadline, and ticket number.

## Launch recommendation

Do not launch publicly yet based only on the patched archive. The source now better matches the plan, and the critical static/audit checks pass, but the hard launch gate still depends on full CI, Prisma migration validation, deployment verification, and production secret rotation.

The patched archive is suitable for the next CI/staging pass. Treat it as implementation-ready source, not production clearance. Production clearance comes from reproducible evidence, not vibes in a ZIP file.
