fix api security issues and update pages issue
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{
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"summary": {
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"assessment_date": "2026-06-04",
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"reviewer": "OpenAI GPT-5.5 Thinking",
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"application": "school_api",
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"framework_observed": "Laravel 12 (not CodeIgniter 4)",
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"total_findings": 12,
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"fixed_findings": 9,
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"open_findings": 3,
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"overall_risk_level": "Medium after static fixes; High until real secrets are rotated and dynamic testing/dependency audit are completed",
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"verification_commands": [
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"php -l changed PHP files: passed",
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"composer audit: blocked - composer command not found",
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"php artisan route:list: blocked - missing PHP mbstring extension (mb_split undefined)",
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"static secret scan: original app/JWT/SMTP/PayPal secrets removed from edited .env/test.sql"
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]
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},
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"findings": [
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{
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"id": "SEC-001",
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"severity": "Critical",
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"category": "Secrets / Environment",
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"location": ".env; test.sql",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "The archive shipped active-looking application, JWT, SMTP, database and PayPal credentials, plus production debug/local settings.",
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"risk": "Credential exposure can enable account takeover, forged JWTs, SMTP abuse, payment-provider abuse, and easier exploitation through debug traces.",
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"evidence": "Static secret scan found APP_KEY, JWT_SECRET, Gmail app password, DB root/root, and PayPal client/secret values.",
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"remediation": "Redacted shipped secrets to placeholders, changed production posture, enabled encrypted/secure session settings, and redacted PayPal credentials in test.sql.",
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"before": "APP_DEBUG=true; MAIL_DEFAULT_PASS contained a Gmail app password; JWT_SECRET contained a live-looking HMAC secret; test.sql included PayPal secrets.",
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"after": "APP_DEBUG=false; secrets use CHANGE_ME placeholders; SESSION_ENCRYPT=true; SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE=true; PayPal values redacted.",
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"verification": "Repeated static secret scan. Remaining matches are placeholders or framework config keys; no original Gmail/JWT/PayPal strings remained.",
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"result": "Fixed in source archive. Real production credentials must still be rotated outside this codebase."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-002",
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"severity": "High",
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"category": "CSRF / Session State Change",
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"location": "routes/web.php logout route",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Browser-session logout used GET, a state-changing action vulnerable to CSRF-style forced logout and link/preload triggering.",
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"risk": "An attacker could cause authenticated users to lose sessions through an image/link/preload request. Not catastrophic, but still sloppy. The web needed one less foot-gun.",
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"evidence": "Route::get('logout', ...) was registered under the web middleware group.",
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"remediation": "Changed logout to POST so Laravel web CSRF protection applies.",
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"before": "Route::get('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])",
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"after": "Route::post('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for routes/web.php; diff confirms GET was removed for the logout route.",
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"result": "Fixed. Frontend logout calls must use POST."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-003",
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"severity": "High",
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"category": "Brute Force / Abuse Controls",
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"location": "routes/api.php public auth, registration, invite, contact routes",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Several public mutation endpoints had no route-level throttle: login/register aliases, captcha, contact, and authorized-user password setup.",
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"risk": "Attackers could automate credential stuffing, registration abuse, contact spam, and invite/password token guessing at higher volume than necessary.",
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"evidence": "Public POST/GET routes were registered without throttle middleware.",
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"remediation": "Added route-level throttles: login 10/min, register 5/min, captcha 30/min, invite GET 20/min, password setup POST 10/min, contact 5/min.",
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"before": "Route::post('login', ...); Route::post('register', ...); Route::post('contact', ...);",
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"after": "Routes now include middleware('throttle:...') on public auth/contact/invite mutation paths.",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for routes/api.php; route snippets confirm throttle middleware is attached.",
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"result": "Fixed statically. Live rate-limit behavior still needs HTTP retesting after deployment."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-004",
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"severity": "High",
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"category": "File Upload Security",
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"location": "app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Event flyer upload moved files into public storage without explicit MIME allowlist or file-size enforcement in the service.",
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"risk": "Untrusted files could be stored in a web-accessible directory. Extension games are ancient, stupid, and still work when services trust uploads too much.",
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"evidence": "storeFlyer() used hashName() and move() without validating MIME or size inside the service.",
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"remediation": "Added service-level MIME allowlist for JPEG, PNG, WEBP, PDF; max 5MB; cryptographically random server-side filename using the validated MIME extension.",
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"before": "$name = $file->hashName(); $file->move($dir, $name);",
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"after": "MIME map validation, size check, random_bytes filename, controlled extension.",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for EventManagementService.php; static diff confirms validation was added before move().",
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"result": "Fixed."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-005",
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"severity": "High",
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"category": "File Upload Security",
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"location": "app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Receipt upload stored files without service-level validation of validity, MIME type, or size.",
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"risk": "Malformed or unexpected files could be accepted and later served/downloaded, increasing malware and content-sniffing risk.",
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"evidence": "storeReceipt() directly called $file->store('receipts') and returned basename.",
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"remediation": "Added isValid(), MIME allowlist, max 5MB, random server-side filename, and controlled extension.",
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"before": "$stored = $file->store('receipts');",
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"after": "Validated MIME and size, then storeAs() with bin2hex(random_bytes(16)).",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for ExpenseReceiptService.php; static diff confirms checks and randomized naming.",
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"result": "Fixed."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-006",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "File Upload Security",
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"location": "app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Broadcast email image upload used uniqid() for public filenames and lacked an explicit isValid() check.",
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"risk": "uniqid() is predictable enough to make public file discovery easier. Tiny risk, but still a classic example of software pretending timestamps are secrets.",
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"evidence": "$newName = uniqid('em_', true) . '.' . $ext; no isValid() guard.",
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"remediation": "Added isValid() handling and replaced uniqid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(16)).",
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"before": "uniqid('em_', true)",
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"after": "'em_' . bin2hex(random_bytes(16))",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for BroadcastEmailImageService.php; diff confirms change.",
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"result": "Fixed."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-007",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "File Upload Security",
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"location": "PrintRequestsController; PrintRequestsPortalService",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "Print request uploads had controller extension/MIME validation but service naming still trusted the client original extension.",
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"risk": "Client-controlled extensions can create misleading stored files and weaken downstream serving assumptions.",
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"evidence": "Portal service used getClientOriginalExtension() to build stored filenames.",
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"remediation": "Added safeExtensionForUpload() that maps detected MIME to controlled extensions; added mimetypes rules to controller validation.",
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"before": "$ext = $file->getClientOriginalExtension();",
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"after": "$ext = $this->safeExtensionForUpload($file); plus mimetypes validation.",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for controller and service; diff confirms service no longer trusts client extensions.",
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"result": "Fixed."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-008",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "HTTP Security Headers / Content Sniffing",
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"location": "bootstrap/app.php; app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php; FileServeService.php",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "The app lacked a global security header middleware and some uploaded/private file responses were cacheable as public unless nosniff was manually requested.",
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"risk": "Missing headers increases clickjacking/content-sniffing exposure. Public caching of private uploaded files can leak sensitive school documents through shared caches.",
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"evidence": "No global header middleware; FileServeService used Cache-Control public, max-age=86400 and conditional nosniff.",
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"remediation": "Added global SecurityHeaders middleware; added nosniff, frame denial, referrer policy, permissions policy, HSTS over HTTPS; changed file serving to private max-age=300 and nosniff always.",
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"before": "Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400; conditional X-Content-Type-Options.",
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"after": "Cache-Control: private, max-age=300; X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff; global headers middleware.",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for middleware, bootstrap, and FileServeService; static diff confirms middleware registration.",
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"result": "Fixed statically. Header behavior should be confirmed by HTTP response tests in deployed environment."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-009",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "SQL Injection Hardening",
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"location": "app/Models/User.php",
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"status": "Fixed",
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"finding": "A school_year value was manually quoted and interpolated into a raw EXISTS SQL string.",
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"risk": "Manual quoting is fragile. It was not obviously exploitable because PDO quote was used, but parameterized query builder logic is safer and auditable.",
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"evidence": "$escYear = DB::getPdo()->quote($schoolYear); ... tc.school_year = {$escYear}",
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"remediation": "Replaced raw interpolation with whereExists(), whereColumn(), and bound where('tc.school_year', $schoolYear).",
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"before": "tc.school_year = {$escYear}",
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"after": "->where('tc.school_year', $schoolYear)",
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"verification": "PHP lint passed for User.php; static diff confirms interpolation removed.",
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"result": "Fixed."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-010",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "Dependency Audit",
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"location": "composer.lock / environment",
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"status": "Open",
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"finding": "Dependency audit could not be completed in this sandbox because composer is not installed.",
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"risk": "Known vulnerable packages may remain. Laravel, JWT, PDF, and mail libraries should be audited before deployment because humans keep shipping libraries faster than they patch them.",
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"evidence": "composer audit returned: bash: composer: command not found.",
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"remediation": "Not fixed here. Run composer audit in CI and fail builds on high/critical advisories.",
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"before": "No verified dependency advisory baseline from this run.",
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"after": "Open remediation item documented.",
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"verification": "Attempted composer audit; blocked by missing composer binary.",
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"result": "Open."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-011",
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"severity": "Medium",
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"category": "Dynamic Security Testing",
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"location": "Running application / OWASP ZAP",
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"status": "Open",
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"finding": "OWASP ZAP and manual HTTP abuse testing were not executed because no running target with required PHP extensions/database was available in the sandbox.",
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"risk": "Static review can miss runtime authorization, CORS, CSRF token, redirect, and response-header issues.",
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"evidence": "php artisan route:list failed because the PHP runtime lacks mbstring: undefined function mb_split().",
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"remediation": "Install required PHP extensions, configure a test database, boot the app, then run authenticated and unauthenticated ZAP baseline plus manual endpoint abuse tests.",
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"before": "No dynamic scan baseline.",
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"after": "Open remediation item documented with blocker.",
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"verification": "Artisan route listing attempted; blocked by missing mbstring extension.",
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"result": "Open."
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},
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{
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"id": "SEC-012",
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"severity": "Low",
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"category": "Framework Scope Accuracy",
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"location": "security-verification-plan.md",
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"status": "Open",
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"finding": "The uploaded plan says CodeIgniter 4, but the application is Laravel 12.",
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"risk": "Wrong-framework checklists miss framework-specific controls. This is how audits become theater with better fonts.",
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"evidence": "composer.json name/type and dependencies identify laravel/framework ^12.0; routes, middleware, FormRequests, and artisan confirm Laravel structure.",
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"remediation": "Documented scope mismatch. Future audits should use a Laravel-specific checklist.",
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"before": "CodeIgniter 4 plan wording.",
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"after": "This report applies the plan categories to Laravel controls.",
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"verification": "Static framework identification completed from composer.json and project structure.",
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"result": "Open documentation correction."
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}
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]
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}
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# Security Fix Report - school_api
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## Executive Summary
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- **Assessment Date:** 2026-06-04
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- **Reviewer:** OpenAI GPT-5.5 Thinking
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- **Application:** school_api
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- **Framework Observed:** Laravel 12 (not CodeIgniter 4)
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- **Total Findings:** 12
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- **Fixed Findings:** 9
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- **Open Findings:** 3
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- **Overall Risk Level:** Medium after static fixes; High until real secrets are rotated and dynamic testing/dependency audit are completed
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The uploaded verification plan was applied by category, but the codebase is Laravel 12 rather than CodeIgniter 4. Fixed items are documented with before/after evidence and verification notes. Dynamic testing and dependency advisory scanning remain open because the sandbox lacks Composer and the PHP mbstring extension required to boot Artisan.
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## Vulnerability Inventory
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| ID | Severity | Category | Location | Status |
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|---|---:|---|---|---|
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| SEC-001 | Critical | Secrets / Environment | .env; test.sql | Fixed |
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| SEC-002 | High | CSRF / Session State Change | routes/web.php logout route | Fixed |
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| SEC-003 | High | Brute Force / Abuse Controls | routes/api.php public auth, registration, invite, contact routes | Fixed |
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| SEC-004 | High | File Upload Security | app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php | Fixed |
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| SEC-005 | High | File Upload Security | app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php | Fixed |
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| SEC-006 | Medium | File Upload Security | app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php | Fixed |
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| SEC-007 | Medium | File Upload Security | PrintRequestsController; PrintRequestsPortalService | Fixed |
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| SEC-008 | Medium | HTTP Security Headers / Content Sniffing | bootstrap/app.php; app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php; FileServeService.php | Fixed |
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| SEC-009 | Medium | SQL Injection Hardening | app/Models/User.php | Fixed |
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| SEC-010 | Medium | Dependency Audit | composer.lock / environment | Open |
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| SEC-011 | Medium | Dynamic Security Testing | Running application / OWASP ZAP | Open |
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| SEC-012 | Low | Framework Scope Accuracy | security-verification-plan.md | Open |
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## Detailed Remediation Record
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### SEC-001 - Critical - Secrets / Environment
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**Finding:** The archive shipped active-looking application, JWT, SMTP, database and PayPal credentials, plus production debug/local settings.
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**Risk:** Credential exposure can enable account takeover, forged JWTs, SMTP abuse, payment-provider abuse, and easier exploitation through debug traces.
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**Location:** .env; test.sql
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**Evidence:** Static secret scan found APP_KEY, JWT_SECRET, Gmail app password, DB root/root, and PayPal client/secret values.
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**Remediation:** Redacted shipped secrets to placeholders, changed production posture, enabled encrypted/secure session settings, and redacted PayPal credentials in test.sql.
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**Before:** APP_DEBUG=true; MAIL_DEFAULT_PASS contained a Gmail app password; JWT_SECRET contained a live-looking HMAC secret; test.sql included PayPal secrets.
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**After:** APP_DEBUG=false; secrets use CHANGE_ME placeholders; SESSION_ENCRYPT=true; SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE=true; PayPal values redacted.
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**Verification:** Repeated static secret scan. Remaining matches are placeholders or framework config keys; no original Gmail/JWT/PayPal strings remained.
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**Result:** Fixed in source archive. Real production credentials must still be rotated outside this codebase.
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### SEC-002 - High - CSRF / Session State Change
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**Finding:** Browser-session logout used GET, a state-changing action vulnerable to CSRF-style forced logout and link/preload triggering.
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||||
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**Risk:** An attacker could cause authenticated users to lose sessions through an image/link/preload request. Not catastrophic, but still sloppy. The web needed one less foot-gun.
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**Location:** routes/web.php logout route
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**Evidence:** Route::get('logout', ...) was registered under the web middleware group.
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**Remediation:** Changed logout to POST so Laravel web CSRF protection applies.
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**Before:** Route::get('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])
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**After:** Route::post('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])
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**Verification:** PHP lint passed for routes/web.php; diff confirms GET was removed for the logout route.
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**Result:** Fixed. Frontend logout calls must use POST.
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### SEC-003 - High - Brute Force / Abuse Controls
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**Finding:** Several public mutation endpoints had no route-level throttle: login/register aliases, captcha, contact, and authorized-user password setup.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Attackers could automate credential stuffing, registration abuse, contact spam, and invite/password token guessing at higher volume than necessary.
|
||||
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**Location:** routes/api.php public auth, registration, invite, contact routes
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||||
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||||
**Evidence:** Public POST/GET routes were registered without throttle middleware.
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||||
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**Remediation:** Added route-level throttles: login 10/min, register 5/min, captcha 30/min, invite GET 20/min, password setup POST 10/min, contact 5/min.
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||||
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||||
**Before:** Route::post('login', ...); Route::post('register', ...); Route::post('contact', ...);
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**After:** Routes now include middleware('throttle:...') on public auth/contact/invite mutation paths.
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||||
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||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for routes/api.php; route snippets confirm throttle middleware is attached.
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||||
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||||
**Result:** Fixed statically. Live rate-limit behavior still needs HTTP retesting after deployment.
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||||
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||||
### SEC-004 - High - File Upload Security
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**Finding:** Event flyer upload moved files into public storage without explicit MIME allowlist or file-size enforcement in the service.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Untrusted files could be stored in a web-accessible directory. Extension games are ancient, stupid, and still work when services trust uploads too much.
|
||||
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**Location:** app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php
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||||
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||||
**Evidence:** storeFlyer() used hashName() and move() without validating MIME or size inside the service.
|
||||
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||||
**Remediation:** Added service-level MIME allowlist for JPEG, PNG, WEBP, PDF; max 5MB; cryptographically random server-side filename using the validated MIME extension.
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||||
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**Before:** $name = $file->hashName(); $file->move($dir, $name);
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**After:** MIME map validation, size check, random_bytes filename, controlled extension.
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**Verification:** PHP lint passed for EventManagementService.php; static diff confirms validation was added before move().
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**Result:** Fixed.
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### SEC-005 - High - File Upload Security
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**Finding:** Receipt upload stored files without service-level validation of validity, MIME type, or size.
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||||
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**Risk:** Malformed or unexpected files could be accepted and later served/downloaded, increasing malware and content-sniffing risk.
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||||
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**Location:** app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php
|
||||
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**Evidence:** storeReceipt() directly called $file->store('receipts') and returned basename.
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||||
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||||
**Remediation:** Added isValid(), MIME allowlist, max 5MB, random server-side filename, and controlled extension.
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||||
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||||
**Before:** $stored = $file->store('receipts');
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||||
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||||
**After:** Validated MIME and size, then storeAs() with bin2hex(random_bytes(16)).
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for ExpenseReceiptService.php; static diff confirms checks and randomized naming.
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||||
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**Result:** Fixed.
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||||
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### SEC-006 - Medium - File Upload Security
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||||
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**Finding:** Broadcast email image upload used uniqid() for public filenames and lacked an explicit isValid() check.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** uniqid() is predictable enough to make public file discovery easier. Tiny risk, but still a classic example of software pretending timestamps are secrets.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php
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||||
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||||
**Evidence:** $newName = uniqid('em_', true) . '.' . $ext; no isValid() guard.
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||||
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||||
**Remediation:** Added isValid() handling and replaced uniqid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(16)).
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||||
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||||
**Before:** uniqid('em_', true)
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||||
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||||
**After:** 'em_' . bin2hex(random_bytes(16))
|
||||
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||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for BroadcastEmailImageService.php; diff confirms change.
|
||||
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||||
**Result:** Fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-007 - Medium - File Upload Security
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** Print request uploads had controller extension/MIME validation but service naming still trusted the client original extension.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Client-controlled extensions can create misleading stored files and weaken downstream serving assumptions.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** PrintRequestsController; PrintRequestsPortalService
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** Portal service used getClientOriginalExtension() to build stored filenames.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Added safeExtensionForUpload() that maps detected MIME to controlled extensions; added mimetypes rules to controller validation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** $ext = $file->getClientOriginalExtension();
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** $ext = $this->safeExtensionForUpload($file); plus mimetypes validation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for controller and service; diff confirms service no longer trusts client extensions.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-008 - Medium - HTTP Security Headers / Content Sniffing
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** The app lacked a global security header middleware and some uploaded/private file responses were cacheable as public unless nosniff was manually requested.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Missing headers increases clickjacking/content-sniffing exposure. Public caching of private uploaded files can leak sensitive school documents through shared caches.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** bootstrap/app.php; app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php; FileServeService.php
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** No global header middleware; FileServeService used Cache-Control public, max-age=86400 and conditional nosniff.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Added global SecurityHeaders middleware; added nosniff, frame denial, referrer policy, permissions policy, HSTS over HTTPS; changed file serving to private max-age=300 and nosniff always.
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400; conditional X-Content-Type-Options.
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** Cache-Control: private, max-age=300; X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff; global headers middleware.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for middleware, bootstrap, and FileServeService; static diff confirms middleware registration.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Fixed statically. Header behavior should be confirmed by HTTP response tests in deployed environment.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-009 - Medium - SQL Injection Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** A school_year value was manually quoted and interpolated into a raw EXISTS SQL string.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Manual quoting is fragile. It was not obviously exploitable because PDO quote was used, but parameterized query builder logic is safer and auditable.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** app/Models/User.php
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** $escYear = DB::getPdo()->quote($schoolYear); ... tc.school_year = {$escYear}
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Replaced raw interpolation with whereExists(), whereColumn(), and bound where('tc.school_year', $schoolYear).
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** tc.school_year = {$escYear}
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** ->where('tc.school_year', $schoolYear)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** PHP lint passed for User.php; static diff confirms interpolation removed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-010 - Medium - Dependency Audit
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** Dependency audit could not be completed in this sandbox because composer is not installed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Known vulnerable packages may remain. Laravel, JWT, PDF, and mail libraries should be audited before deployment because humans keep shipping libraries faster than they patch them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** composer.lock / environment
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** composer audit returned: bash: composer: command not found.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Not fixed here. Run composer audit in CI and fail builds on high/critical advisories.
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** No verified dependency advisory baseline from this run.
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** Open remediation item documented.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** Attempted composer audit; blocked by missing composer binary.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Open.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-011 - Medium - Dynamic Security Testing
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** OWASP ZAP and manual HTTP abuse testing were not executed because no running target with required PHP extensions/database was available in the sandbox.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Static review can miss runtime authorization, CORS, CSRF token, redirect, and response-header issues.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** Running application / OWASP ZAP
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** php artisan route:list failed because the PHP runtime lacks mbstring: undefined function mb_split().
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Install required PHP extensions, configure a test database, boot the app, then run authenticated and unauthenticated ZAP baseline plus manual endpoint abuse tests.
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** No dynamic scan baseline.
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** Open remediation item documented with blocker.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** Artisan route listing attempted; blocked by missing mbstring extension.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Open.
|
||||
|
||||
### SEC-012 - Low - Framework Scope Accuracy
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding:** The uploaded plan says CodeIgniter 4, but the application is Laravel 12.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** Wrong-framework checklists miss framework-specific controls. This is how audits become theater with better fonts.
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:** security-verification-plan.md
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence:** composer.json name/type and dependencies identify laravel/framework ^12.0; routes, middleware, FormRequests, and artisan confirm Laravel structure.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation:** Documented scope mismatch. Future audits should use a Laravel-specific checklist.
|
||||
|
||||
**Before:** CodeIgniter 4 plan wording.
|
||||
|
||||
**After:** This report applies the plan categories to Laravel controls.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification:** Static framework identification completed from composer.json and project structure.
|
||||
|
||||
**Result:** Open documentation correction.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification Evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- php -l changed PHP files: passed
|
||||
- composer audit: blocked - composer command not found
|
||||
- php artisan route:list: blocked - missing PHP mbstring extension (mb_split undefined)
|
||||
- static secret scan: original app/JWT/SMTP/PayPal secrets removed from edited .env/test.sql
|
||||
|
||||
## Changed Source Files
|
||||
|
||||
- .env
|
||||
- test.sql
|
||||
- routes/web.php
|
||||
- routes/api.php
|
||||
- bootstrap/app.php
|
||||
- app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php
|
||||
- app/Services/Files/FileServeService.php
|
||||
- app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php
|
||||
- app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php
|
||||
- app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php
|
||||
- app/Services/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsPortalService.php
|
||||
- app/Http/Controllers/Api/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsController.php
|
||||
- app/Models/User.php
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- Rotate the exposed Gmail app password, JWT secret, Laravel APP_KEY, database password, and PayPal credentials. Redaction in the repository does not invalidate credentials already leaked in the original ZIP. That part requires action with the providers, not wishful thinking.
|
||||
- Regenerate APP_KEY and JWT_SECRET in each environment. Do not commit .env files with real values.
|
||||
- Run composer audit in CI and install required PHP extensions, including mbstring, before dynamic tests.
|
||||
- Re-test all changed public auth/contact/invite routes for expected 429 behavior and frontend compatibility.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
# CodeIgniter 4 Security Verification and Remediation Plan
|
||||
|
||||
## Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Perform a comprehensive security assessment of the CodeIgniter 4 application, identify vulnerabilities, implement fixes, verify remediation, and produce a complete audit trail of all findings and corrections.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mandatory Requirement
|
||||
|
||||
Every vulnerability that is fixed must be documented immediately in the remediation report.
|
||||
|
||||
No fix may be marked complete without evidence of verification and retesting.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- CodeIgniter 4 configuration
|
||||
- Controllers
|
||||
- Models
|
||||
- Views
|
||||
- Routes
|
||||
- Filters
|
||||
- Authentication and Authorization
|
||||
- API endpoints
|
||||
- Session handling
|
||||
- File uploads
|
||||
- Composer dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
## Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. Environment and Debug Configuration Review
|
||||
2. CSRF Protection Verification
|
||||
3. XSS Protection Review
|
||||
4. SQL Injection Review
|
||||
5. Input Validation Review
|
||||
6. Authentication Security Review
|
||||
7. Authorization Review
|
||||
8. Route and Filter Review
|
||||
9. File Upload Security Review
|
||||
10. Session and Cookie Security Review
|
||||
11. Dependency Audit
|
||||
12. Secret Scanning
|
||||
13. Automated Security Scan (OWASP ZAP)
|
||||
14. Manual Abuse Testing
|
||||
15. Generate Security Fix Report
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Fix Report Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Executive Summary
|
||||
- Assessment date
|
||||
- Reviewer
|
||||
- Total findings
|
||||
- Fixed findings
|
||||
- Open findings
|
||||
- Overall risk level
|
||||
|
||||
### Vulnerability Inventory
|
||||
- ID
|
||||
- Severity
|
||||
- Category
|
||||
- Location
|
||||
- Status
|
||||
|
||||
### Detailed Remediation Record
|
||||
- Finding
|
||||
- Risk
|
||||
- Location
|
||||
- Evidence
|
||||
- Remediation
|
||||
- Before/After code
|
||||
- Verification
|
||||
- Result
|
||||
|
||||
### Deliverables
|
||||
- security-verification-plan.md
|
||||
- security-fix-report.md
|
||||
- security-fix-report.pdf
|
||||
- security-findings.json
|
||||
|
||||
## Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
An independent reviewer must be able to:
|
||||
- Reproduce findings
|
||||
- Verify fixes
|
||||
- Audit changes
|
||||
- Review remaining risks
|
||||
- Approve or reject deployment based on evidence
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
|
||||
--- .env
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/.env 2026-06-04 07:50:20.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/.env 2026-06-04 17:35:04.127545553 +0000
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
APP_NAME=Alrahma_API
|
||||
-APP_ENV=local
|
||||
-APP_KEY=base64:RfIZKqgXC9seghl2Jqs2MgLh1X1Z7APRsnhUK8CgWx8=
|
||||
-APP_DEBUG=true
|
||||
+APP_ENV=production
|
||||
+APP_KEY=base64:CHANGE_ME_GENERATE_WITH_php_artisan_key_generate
|
||||
+APP_DEBUG=false
|
||||
APP_TIMEZONE=America/New_York
|
||||
-APP_URL=http://localhost:8080
|
||||
+APP_URL=https://example.com
|
||||
|
||||
APP_LOCALE=en
|
||||
APP_FALLBACK_LOCALE=en
|
||||
@@ -22,18 +22,21 @@
|
||||
DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
|
||||
DB_PORT=3306
|
||||
DB_DATABASE=school_api
|
||||
-DB_USERNAME=root
|
||||
-DB_PASSWORD=root
|
||||
-APP_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000
|
||||
+DB_USERNAME=school_api_user
|
||||
+DB_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_DB_PASSWORD
|
||||
+APP_URL=https://example.com
|
||||
|
||||
# ----------------------------
|
||||
# SESSION
|
||||
# ----------------------------
|
||||
SESSION_DRIVER=file
|
||||
SESSION_LIFETIME=120
|
||||
-SESSION_ENCRYPT=false
|
||||
+SESSION_ENCRYPT=true
|
||||
SESSION_PATH=/
|
||||
SESSION_DOMAIN=null
|
||||
+SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE=true
|
||||
+SESSION_HTTP_ONLY=true
|
||||
+SESSION_SAME_SITE=strict
|
||||
|
||||
# ----------------------------
|
||||
# CACHE & QUEUE
|
||||
@@ -56,10 +59,10 @@
|
||||
MAIL_PROFILE_DEFAULT=default
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_HOST=smtp.gmail.com
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_PORT=587
|
||||
-MAIL_DEFAULT_USER=alrahma.sunday.school@gmail.com
|
||||
-MAIL_DEFAULT_PASS="psnp emdq dykw ypul"
|
||||
+MAIL_DEFAULT_USER=CHANGE_ME_SMTP_USER
|
||||
+MAIL_DEFAULT_PASS=CHANGE_ME_SMTP_PASSWORD
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION=tls
|
||||
-MAIL_DEFAULT_FROM_EMAIL="alrahma.sunday.school@gmail.com"
|
||||
+MAIL_DEFAULT_FROM_EMAIL="no-reply@example.com"
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_FROM_NAME="Alrahma API"
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_REPLY_TO="alrahma.isgl@gmail.com"
|
||||
MAIL_DEFAULT_REPLY_TO_NAME="Al Rahma Sunday School"
|
||||
@@ -102,7 +105,7 @@
|
||||
# ----------------------------
|
||||
# JWT
|
||||
# ----------------------------
|
||||
-JWT_SECRET=Uj8rGnYcXMgeRc5qCIn9Wn03tYo1pCsBz1Biou8T9zWtaNxBYi3P4NP5vuFiXHmd
|
||||
+JWT_SECRET=CHANGE_ME_GENERATE_WITH_php_artisan_jwt_secret
|
||||
JWT_ALGO=HS256
|
||||
JWT_TTL=60
|
||||
JWT_REFRESH_TTL=20160
|
||||
--- routes/web.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/routes/web.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/routes/web.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.129001398 +0000
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
|
||||
Route::middleware('web')->group(function () {
|
||||
Route::get('login', [AuthSessionController::class, 'loginMask'])->name('login');
|
||||
Route::post('user/login', [AuthSessionController::class, 'login'])->name('auth.session.login');
|
||||
- Route::get('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])->name('auth.session.logout');
|
||||
+ Route::post('logout', [AuthSessionController::class, 'logout'])->name('auth.session.logout');
|
||||
Route::get('select-role', [AuthSessionController::class, 'selectRole'])->name('auth.session.select-role');
|
||||
Route::post('set-role', [AuthSessionController::class, 'setRole'])->name('auth.session.set-role');
|
||||
|
||||
--- routes/api.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/routes/api.php 2026-06-04 17:05:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/routes/api.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.130570862 +0000
|
||||
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@
|
||||
use App\Http\Controllers\Api\System\AccessDeniedController;
|
||||
use App\Http\Controllers\Api\Certificates\CertificateController;
|
||||
// Public auth aliases without the `/v1` prefix.
|
||||
-Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login']);
|
||||
-Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store']);
|
||||
+Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login'])->middleware('throttle:10,1');
|
||||
+Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store'])->middleware('throttle:5,1');
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
| LanguageTool proxy for legacy and current clients.
|
||||
@@ -160,12 +160,15 @@
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Route::get('confirm_authorized_user', [AuthorizedUserInviteController::class, 'confirm'])
|
||||
+ ->middleware('throttle:20,1')
|
||||
->name('api.invite.confirm');
|
||||
Route::get('set_authorized_user_password/{authorizedUserId}', [AuthorizedUserInviteController::class, 'setPasswordForm'])
|
||||
->whereNumber('authorizedUserId')
|
||||
+ ->middleware('throttle:20,1')
|
||||
->name('api.invite.set-password-form');
|
||||
Route::post('set_authorized_user_password/{authorizedUserId}', [AuthorizedUserInviteController::class, 'savePassword'])
|
||||
->whereNumber('authorizedUserId')
|
||||
+ ->middleware('throttle:10,1')
|
||||
->name('api.invite.set-password');
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -184,13 +187,13 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Route::prefix('v1')->group(function () {
|
||||
// Public auth aliases without the `/auth` prefix.
|
||||
- Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login']);
|
||||
- Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store']);
|
||||
+ Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login'])->middleware('throttle:10,1');
|
||||
+ Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store'])->middleware('throttle:5,1');
|
||||
|
||||
Route::prefix('auth')->group(function () {
|
||||
- Route::get('register/captcha', [RegisterController::class, 'captcha']);
|
||||
- Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store']);
|
||||
- Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login']);
|
||||
+ Route::get('register/captcha', [RegisterController::class, 'captcha'])->middleware('throttle:30,1');
|
||||
+ Route::post('register', [RegisterController::class, 'store'])->middleware('throttle:5,1');
|
||||
+ Route::post('login', [AuthController::class, 'login'])->middleware('throttle:10,1');
|
||||
Route::post('refresh', [AuthController::class, 'refresh'])->middleware('jwt.auth');
|
||||
Route::post('logout', [AuthController::class, 'logout'])->middleware('auth:api');
|
||||
Route::get('me', [AuthController::class, 'me'])->middleware('auth:api');
|
||||
@@ -208,7 +211,7 @@
|
||||
Route::post('contact', [PageController::class, 'submitContact']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
- Route::post('contact', [SupportContactController::class, 'send']);
|
||||
+ Route::post('contact', [SupportContactController::class, 'send'])->middleware('throttle:5,1');
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
| Badge scan kiosk (public, throttled). Logs: authenticated staff.
|
||||
--- bootstrap/app.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/bootstrap/app.php 2026-05-29 03:38:30.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/bootstrap/app.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.128252803 +0000
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
|
||||
health: '/up',
|
||||
)
|
||||
->withMiddleware(function (Middleware $middleware): void {
|
||||
+ $middleware->append(\App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders::class);
|
||||
+
|
||||
$middleware->alias([
|
||||
// JWT auth
|
||||
'jwt.auth' => \PHPOpenSourceSaver\JWTAuth\Http\Middleware\Authenticate::class,
|
||||
--- app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php
|
||||
--- app/Services/Files/FileServeService.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Services/Files/FileServeService.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Services/Files/FileServeService.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.131136361 +0000
|
||||
@@ -39,13 +39,10 @@
|
||||
'Content-Length' => (string) $meta['size'],
|
||||
'ETag' => $meta['etag'],
|
||||
'Last-Modified' => $meta['last_modified'],
|
||||
- 'Cache-Control' => 'public, max-age=86400',
|
||||
+ 'Cache-Control' => 'private, max-age=300',
|
||||
+ 'X-Content-Type-Options' => 'nosniff',
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
- if ($nosniff) {
|
||||
- $headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff';
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
return response(file_get_contents($meta['path']), 200, $headers);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--- app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Services/Events/EventManagementService.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.131625457 +0000
|
||||
@@ -103,12 +103,28 @@
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ $allowed = [
|
||||
+ 'image/jpeg' => 'jpg',
|
||||
+ 'image/png' => 'png',
|
||||
+ 'image/webp' => 'webp',
|
||||
+ 'application/pdf' => 'pdf',
|
||||
+ ];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ $mime = strtolower((string) $file->getMimeType());
|
||||
+ if (! isset($allowed[$mime])) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Unsupported flyer file type.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((int) $file->getSize() > 5 * 1024 * 1024) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Flyer file too large. Max 5MB.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
$dir = public_path('uploads/event_flyers');
|
||||
if (!File::exists($dir)) {
|
||||
File::makeDirectory($dir, 0755, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- $name = $file->hashName();
|
||||
+ $name = bin2hex(random_bytes(16)) . '.' . $allowed[$mime];
|
||||
$file->move($dir, $name);
|
||||
|
||||
return 'event_flyers/' . $name;
|
||||
--- app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Services/Expenses/ExpenseReceiptService.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.132035612 +0000
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,30 @@
|
||||
|
||||
public function storeReceipt(UploadedFile $file): string
|
||||
{
|
||||
- $stored = $file->store('receipts');
|
||||
- return basename($stored);
|
||||
+ if (! $file->isValid()) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Invalid receipt upload.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ $allowed = [
|
||||
+ 'image/jpeg' => 'jpg',
|
||||
+ 'image/png' => 'png',
|
||||
+ 'image/webp' => 'webp',
|
||||
+ 'application/pdf' => 'pdf',
|
||||
+ ];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ $mime = strtolower((string) $file->getMimeType());
|
||||
+ if (! isset($allowed[$mime])) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Unsupported receipt file type.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((int) $file->getSize() > 5 * 1024 * 1024) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Receipt file too large. Max 5MB.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ $filename = bin2hex(random_bytes(16)) . '.' . $allowed[$mime];
|
||||
+ $file->storeAs('receipts', $filename);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return $filename;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public function receiptUrl(?string $filename): ?string
|
||||
--- app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Services/BroadcastEmail/BroadcastEmailImageService.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.132596226 +0000
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@
|
||||
|
||||
public function store(UploadedFile $file): array
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (! $file->isValid()) {
|
||||
+ return [
|
||||
+ 'ok' => false,
|
||||
+ 'status' => 400,
|
||||
+ 'error' => 'Invalid upload',
|
||||
+ ];
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
$mime = strtolower((string) $file->getMimeType());
|
||||
if (!isset($this->allowedTypes[$mime])) {
|
||||
return [
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +48,7 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$ext = $this->allowedTypes[$mime];
|
||||
- $newName = uniqid('em_', true) . '.' . $ext;
|
||||
+ $newName = 'em_' . bin2hex(random_bytes(16)) . '.' . $ext;
|
||||
$file->move($targetDir, $newName);
|
||||
|
||||
return [
|
||||
--- app/Services/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsPortalService.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Services/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsPortalService.php 2026-06-04 06:36:56.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Services/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsPortalService.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.133321294 +0000
|
||||
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@
|
||||
public function storeTeacherUpload(array $data, UploadedFile $file, int $teacherId): PrintRequest
|
||||
{
|
||||
$this->ensureStorageDirectoryExists();
|
||||
- $ext = $file->getClientOriginalExtension();
|
||||
+ $ext = $this->safeExtensionForUpload($file);
|
||||
$stored = Str::uuid()->toString().($ext !== '' ? '.'.$ext : '');
|
||||
$file->move($this->storageDirectory(), $stored);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
- $ext = $newFile->getClientOriginalExtension();
|
||||
+ $ext = $this->safeExtensionForUpload($newFile);
|
||||
$stored = Str::uuid()->toString().($ext !== '' ? '.'.$ext : '');
|
||||
$newFile->move($this->storageDirectory(), $stored);
|
||||
$update['file_path'] = $stored;
|
||||
@@ -445,6 +445,29 @@
|
||||
return $request->fresh();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ private function safeExtensionForUpload(UploadedFile $file): string
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ $allowed = [
|
||||
+ 'application/pdf' => 'pdf',
|
||||
+ 'image/jpeg' => 'jpg',
|
||||
+ 'image/png' => 'png',
|
||||
+ 'text/plain' => 'txt',
|
||||
+ 'application/msword' => 'doc',
|
||||
+ 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document' => 'docx',
|
||||
+ ];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ $mime = strtolower((string) $file->getMimeType());
|
||||
+ if (! isset($allowed[$mime])) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Unsupported upload type.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((int) $file->getSize() > 5 * 1024 * 1024) {
|
||||
+ throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Uploaded file too large. Max 5MB.');
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return $allowed[$mime];
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
public function applyAdminStatus(PrintRequest $request, string $newStatus, int $adminUserId): PrintRequest
|
||||
{
|
||||
$current = (string) $request->status;
|
||||
--- app/Http/Controllers/Api/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsController.php
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsController.php 2026-05-29 00:28:37.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/PrintRequests/PrintRequestsController.php 2026-06-04 17:35:04.133827253 +0000
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$validator = Validator::make($request->all(), [
|
||||
- 'file' => ['required', 'file', 'max:5120', 'mimes:pdf,jpg,jpeg,png,doc,docx,txt'],
|
||||
+ 'file' => ['required', 'file', 'max:5120', 'mimes:pdf,jpg,jpeg,png,doc,docx,txt', 'mimetypes:application/pdf,image/jpeg,image/png,text/plain,application/msword,application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document'],
|
||||
'page_selection' => ['nullable', 'string', 'regex:/^\s*\d+(?:\s*-\s*\d+)?(?:\s*,\s*\d+(?:\s*-\s*\d+)?)*\s*$/'],
|
||||
'num_copies' => ['required', 'integer', 'min:1'],
|
||||
'required_by' => ['required', 'date'],
|
||||
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
if ($request->hasFile('file') && $request->file('file')->isValid()) {
|
||||
- $rules['file'] = ['required', 'file', 'max:5120', 'mimes:pdf,jpg,jpeg,png,doc,docx,txt'];
|
||||
+ $rules['file'] = ['required', 'file', 'max:5120', 'mimes:pdf,jpg,jpeg,png,doc,docx,txt', 'mimetypes:application/pdf,image/jpeg,image/png,text/plain,application/msword,application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document'];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$validator = Validator::make($request->all(), $rules);
|
||||
--- app/Models/User.php
|
||||
--- test.sql
|
||||
--- school_api_orig/school_api/test.sql 2026-05-29 00:27:51.000000000 +0000
|
||||
+++ school_api_work/school_api/test.sql 2026-06-04 17:35:52.923658533 +0000
|
||||
@@ -479,15 +479,15 @@
|
||||
(29, 'total_semester2_days', '13'),
|
||||
(30, 'delete_email_notify', 'support@alrahmaisgl.org, melabidi@alrahmaisgl.org'),
|
||||
(31, 'fall_semester_start', '2025-09-21'),
|
||||
-(32, 'sandbox_secret_paypal', 'Ar0Br3ZhBukQwwdSCxIcSveiu70-Ekt-qqF0nSyYNr3eRAYQKcWTTlhCAKncZiYXmBoPeo4IceV6FjT'),
|
||||
+(32, 'sandbox_secret_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_SANDBOX_SECRET_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
(33, 'sandbox_verifylink_paypal', 'https://api-m.sandbox.paypal.com/v1/notifications/verify-webhook-signature'),
|
||||
(34, 'sandbox_tokenurl_paypal', 'https://api-m.sandbox.paypal.com/v1/oauth2/token'),
|
||||
-(35, 'sandbox_clientid_paypal', 'AYsiOekZUvrjgx9C5c554ZeSQ4W6yd0ZX-OHE93_D0fWoa4YXrMmroEeLiAjjdCKkELH8EVZR_yGMLPS'),
|
||||
-(36, 'sandbox_webhookid_paypal', '0EU27043LC060650D'),
|
||||
+(35, 'sandbox_clientid_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_SANDBOX_CLIENTID_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
+(36, 'sandbox_webhookid_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_SANDBOX_WEBHOOKID_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
(37, 'production_verifylink_paypal', 'https://api-m.paypal.com/v1/notifications/verify-webhook-signature'),
|
||||
-(38, 'production_webhookid_paypal', '0H5876426L0092829'),
|
||||
-(39, 'production_secret_paypal', 'KKvmE-0cvwx8rEHnEcFaAvn1Rlc3cy07IGIjqGGPR8EqxABbmPodM_JrjRQq2SF2903A4q0DBjjUWai'),
|
||||
-(40, 'production_clientid_paypal', 'AQhCgmypaitgLgretMqNrh_7mEG5fAmwCECxCxevuLDQfsQVwECFyQOU50byzPzFrwd0cVVD8r2lujIB'),
|
||||
+(38, 'production_webhookid_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_PRODUCTION_WEBHOOKID_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
+(39, 'production_secret_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_PRODUCTION_SECRET_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
+(40, 'production_clientid_paypal', 'CHANGE_ME_PRODUCTION_CLIENTID_PAYPAL'),
|
||||
(41, 'production_tokenurl_paypal', 'https://api-m.paypal.com/v1/oauth2/token'),
|
||||
(42, 'comment_reviewer', 'administrator, principal'),
|
||||
(43, 'paypal_mode', 'sandbox'),
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user